San Francisco 49ers: Pro Football’s Gold Standard

NFL Free Agency is a firestorm for creating football discussion.  It garners the majority of attention, while often the true mechanisms of winning go unnoticed.  One such organization that has taken steps necessary to be an elite organization is the San Francisco 49ers.

On March 1, the San Francisco 49ers announced a partnership with SAP, becoming the first NFL organization to partner with big data to improve inefficiencies in their system.  More importantly, it provides a measuring stick, and this system provides it on the fly.  Every other organization that has not embraced this system or something very similar has no chance  for success in a league built on parity and difficult financial decisions.  The longer organizations wait to embrace analytical based systems, the wider the gap will grow between have and have-nots.

The Baltimore Ravens punctuated this further by bringing home a Super Bowl trophy.   They are one of the few NFL organizations with an analytical department.  The parity environment that the NFL has setup is one that manifests a snowball effect.  For every personnel decision that is above the league average success rate, it will create winning momentum.  Success percentage over the league average provides the ability to play with house money.  Every organization that is below the league average in success percentage is handing over wins to those willing to take them.

To highlight a recent example, lets compare two personnel decisions.  One of these decisions is a great decision because it has a high probability of returning success.  The other decision has a low probability of success.

Transaction 1: The San Francisco 49ers acquire Aquan Boldin from the Baltimore Ravens for a 6th round pick and pay him $6 million.

Transaction 2: The Miami Dolphins sign Brian Hartline to a 5 year deal valued at $30.775 million, including $12.5 million guaranteed.  It is an amazing figure for a player that was the #1 WR a year ago yet only scored 1 TD.  There are four years of data to also demonstrate that the 1 was not an aberration.  It was his season total in three of four seasons.

Boldin equaled or bettered the number in 10 of his 10 seasons in the league and has scored 7 or more TDs in half of his 10  seasons.  Boldin is an investment in winning while Hartline is just an investment in a player that plays wide receiver.  As long as Miami makes personnel decisions with no fruit in winning, they will be handing over wins to organizations willing to take them, like the San Francisco 49ers.

The Patriot Way And WR Evaluation

One of the organizations I respect is the New England Patriots because they are an organization that embodies intelligence and doing things that are outside the box.  One such example was their ability to redefine how teams use multiple TEs to create on field mismatches.

One area however that the organization has struggled with over the past few years is the evaluation of WRs in the NFL rookie draft.  Lets take a look at their selections of wide receivers since 2000, the year that they selected Brady, so you can see for yourself.

 

Looking at these wide receivers, it is quite easy to understand why they have gone to free agency for wide receivers.  Chad Jackson was the highest WR taken among this group.  As a 2nd round pick, he could be characterized as a complete failure.  As a Patriot, he lasted 2 seasons and only started one game and caught 14 passes.  In one of the key metrics I use as a gauge for WR play, he rated well below the standard bar so it would be no surprise that he struggled at the NFL level.   Matt Slater has caught 1 pass, Taylor Price caught 5, Brandon Tate caught 24, and Bethel Johnson lasted long enough for 35 receptions.  With the exception of Deion Branch, the other 4 WRs taken in the 2nd and 3rd round (Jackson, Tate, Price, and Johnson), the Patriots received a return of only 79 receptions.  A 20% success rate at the position in the draft for rounds 2 and 3 would concern me as an organization.

Wide Receiver is a heavily misjudged position for a number of reasons.  The fact is that this misjudgment has created arbitrage opportunities for an organization looking to take advantage of it.  In 2011, the arbitrage WR was Cecil Shorts, and in 2012, the arbitrage WR plays for an organization where the Head Coach wanted to play Pin the Tail on the Donkey to determine which WRs to keep.  Fortunately for the Miami Dolphins, they cut the WR drafted ahead of Rishard Matthews, then cut Jabar Gaffney, and continued to increase his playing time late in the season.  He compares to two WRs taken in the early first round.

With the known information at this point, the early favorite for this year’s arbitrage WR is emerging.  He is comparing favorably to Roddy White at this early stage and is projected to go on the final day of the draft.  If your organization is looking for a Wide Receiver with that type of comparison for a discount, NFL Data Consultants is the place for you.

Running Backs And Speed Score: Knile Davis and Some Coffee

Football Outsiders created a metric called speed score that measures a speed to weight ratio and has typically been used to gauge potential for RBs.  Unlike the Flying 20 metric mentioned previously, the Speed Score metric for running backs has a higher correlation of success than many of the provided metrics.  It is not full proof though.  There are RBs that score lower than the league average and have a good deal of success and there are those that have high speed scores that do not have success.  There is always more to the story…

So when Knile Davis had a speed score of 124.49, one of the better speed scores ever recorded, it requires a deeper look.  Here is a running back that ran for 1,322 yards and 13 TDs  with a 6.5 yards per carry as a sophomore before running for 377 yards, 2 TDs, and a 3.4 yards per carry as a junior.  On the surface, one might see a Jekyll and Hyde situation.  Interviews aren’t going to tell you which way he leans as a player.  Interviews provide the means to information needed for qualitative analysis within the structure of building a team.

There is a systematic way to evaluate talent.

1)  Can they play? If you think this question can be determined with film alone, then it would be advisable to take a look at some of the past drafts.

2) If they can play, then that is where the qualitative factor comes into play from an organizational fit.  The best character in the world is irrelevant if the first standard is not met.

At NFL Data Consultants, I will not just take into account one metric or one season or one combine.  The purpose is to look below the surface and determine what the answer to #1 really is.  With what is known about Knile Davis to this point between his on field and athletic testing performance, he compares very closely to two backs in particular.  The number of factors in play leads to a high degree of confidence as to where his probability of long term success truly sits.  It is the benefit of using analytics, technology, and the outside the box analysis that NFL Data Consultants provides.

Quarterbacks, Analytics, And Arbitrage

There is an ongoing debate right now regarding who the best Quarterback is of all time, and it usually results in a Joe Montana versus Tom Brady debate.  I see a different problem that needs to be resolved.  Why were neither taken in the first round?  The NFL is a league where the play of an organization’s QB will affect coaches, management, and their families.

With record turnover with Head Coaches and General Managers, the common theme by the media is the inability to find a Quarterback.  From radio to ESPN talking heads, to a recent USA Today article, it is clear that a system that evaluates Quarterbacks well is of tremendous value.

Understanding Quarterbacks is not an easy task, but rather a complex problem.  It takes outside the box analytical thinking.  What if you could bring in not 1, not 2, but 3 Quarterbacks that if provided the opportunity would be successful?  The only way to do that is to understand what leads to success and then use it as a framework to determine the probability of success.  The Cowboys were ahead of their time when they formulated a draft pick chart and used arbitrage to amass talent that would bring multiple Super Bowl Championships.  They understood the value of an asset because they did the research and analysis to make it quantifiable.

The Green Bay Packers had a great stretch of years bringing in Quarterbacks that went on to have success with other organizations, and none of them required an early pick.  Among them were Matt Hasselbeck (6th), Mark Brunnell (5th), Kurt Warner (UDFA), and Aaron Brooks (4th).  None of them were starters sitting behind Favre who was acquired via trade for a 1st round pick.  The type of success by the Packers to evaluate the QB position is something a strong analyical system can replicate.  It proves that an organization can accumulate multiple Quarterbacks that have a high probability of success and are also undervalued in the market.  Using an approach that is measurable, it is very possible to cash in on the arbitrage that exists with Quarterback evaluation.  Obtaining QBs for far below the perceived market value would also help remove the monetary bias and allow a true competition for the job.  And a competition among a good group of Quarterbacks means success for the coaches, management, and their families.  It also means a very satisfied owner and fan base.

The Flying-20 On Trial: An Indicator Of Success For Wide Receivers?

At the MIT Sloan Sports Analytics Conference in 2012, an executive for the 49ers, Parag Marathe,  brought up a metric called the Flying-20.  This is the last 20 yards of a 40 yard dash.  He exclaimed that it is a metric that can be used to predict success, citing Jerry Rice as the example.  Whether Jerry Rice had a fantastic Flying-20 or not is irrelevant in this study.  What is on trial is the validity of the Flying-20 by looking at some of the best Flying-20 scores over the last few years.

 

Flying-20: 1.71

WR A.J. Love and WR Rondel Menendez

Undrafted out of South Florida, Love was waived twice by the Vikings this offseason and failed to catch a pass in preseason.

Menendez (Eastern Kentucky) had a leg up on Love in that he was drafted at #247 in the 1999 draft by the Atlanta Falcons.  Even so, Menendez never had a reception.

Flying-20: 1.72

Tyrone Calico and Eron Riley

Calico ran a tremendous 4.34 out of Middle Tennessee State and was drafted by the Titans in the 2nd round of the 2003 draft.  He played in 27 games, starting 8 and netting 42 catches for 501 yards and 4 TDs.  I would say that it was mighty fine production from a 2nd round pick with such a good Flying-20 score, but I don’t have a sarcasm font available to me.

Eron Riley was undrafted out of Duke and signed with the Ravens after the 2009 draft.  He never played a game for them, lasted 5 days with his next team the Panthers, spent a little time on the Broncos practice squad, and was released in December of 2011 by the Jets.  Just like the WRs with 1.71 Flying-20 scores, Riley does not have an NFL reception.

Flying-20: 1.73

Jeris McIntyre

McIntyre was selected in the 6th round in the 2004 draft by the Kansas City Chiefs after playing college ball at Auburn.  His Flying-20 score and SEC roots were not enough to net him any catches at the NFL level.

We have just looked at the five fastest Flying-20 scores in my database and among the 5 WRs, the average NFL stats are 8.4 receptions, 100.2 yards, and .8 TDs.  That is not a per game stat… that is a per career stat.

Flying-20: 1.74

Trindon Holliday, Ben Obamanu, and Isaiah Jackson

Another SEC player, Trindon Holliday was taken in the 6th round of the 2010 draft by the Houston Texans.  He has shown some dynamic return ability, but he has 6 fumbles to 2 receptions in his career.

Ben Obomanu was a 7th round pick in the 2006 draft by the Seahawks after playing his college ball at Auburn.  In five seasons, he has 87 career receptions for 1,209 yards and 7 TDs.

Isaiah Jackson was undrafted in 2012 out of Central Arkansas.  Although he did put up great workout numbers in his Pro Day, Jackson has not garnered much attention.

Flying-20: 1.75

Darrius Heyward Bey, Troy Williamson, and D’Andre Goodwin

Heyward-Bey was taken 7th overall in the 2009 draft by the Oakland Raiders after playing his college ball at Maryland.  Taken this high, and with one of the best Flying-20 scores, he has to be a shoe-in for success, right?  In 4 seasons, he has caught 140 passes for 2071 yards, and 11 TDs.  That turns out to be 2.5 catches and 37 yards per game.  I am starting to wonder if Marathe was just trying to bait teams into taking the high Flying-20 WRs if they didn’t do their homework.

Troy Williamson was also taken 7th overall in the 2005 draft by the Minnesota Vikings.  He lasted 3 seasons with the Vikings before being traded for a 6th round pick and played 10 games for the Jaguars, netting 8 receptions.  In all, Williamson had 87 catches for 1,131 yards and 4 TDs.

Goodwin went undrafted after the 2011 draft and has yet to catch a pass.  Do you think he is the one likely to break this trend?

In Conclusion:

Now that we have looked at the top 11 Flying-20 scores in recent years, and have very little to show for it, one must be highly skeptical that the Flying-20 is a legitimate metric to evaluate WRs.  In fact, you would have to go 13 deep before you found a WR that made a Pro Bowl roster.  That was Devin Hester, and he made it as a return man.  There is an answer on how to find quality WRs at a fraction of the cost, but it does not appear to be the Flying-20.