Running Backs And Speed Score: Knile Davis and Some Coffee

Football Outsiders created a metric called speed score that measures a speed to weight ratio and has typically been used to gauge potential for RBs.  Unlike the Flying 20 metric mentioned previously, the Speed Score metric for running backs has a higher correlation of success than many of the provided metrics.  It is not full proof though.  There are RBs that score lower than the league average and have a good deal of success and there are those that have high speed scores that do not have success.  There is always more to the story…

So when Knile Davis had a speed score of 124.49, one of the better speed scores ever recorded, it requires a deeper look.  Here is a running back that ran for 1,322 yards and 13 TDs  with a 6.5 yards per carry as a sophomore before running for 377 yards, 2 TDs, and a 3.4 yards per carry as a junior.  On the surface, one might see a Jekyll and Hyde situation.  Interviews aren’t going to tell you which way he leans as a player.  Interviews provide the means to information needed for qualitative analysis within the structure of building a team.

There is a systematic way to evaluate talent.

1)  Can they play? If you think this question can be determined with film alone, then it would be advisable to take a look at some of the past drafts.

2) If they can play, then that is where the qualitative factor comes into play from an organizational fit.  The best character in the world is irrelevant if the first standard is not met.

At NFL Data Consultants, I will not just take into account one metric or one season or one combine.  The purpose is to look below the surface and determine what the answer to #1 really is.  With what is known about Knile Davis to this point between his on field and athletic testing performance, he compares very closely to two backs in particular.  The number of factors in play leads to a high degree of confidence as to where his probability of long term success truly sits.  It is the benefit of using analytics, technology, and the outside the box analysis that NFL Data Consultants provides.

Quarterbacks, Analytics, And Arbitrage

There is an ongoing debate right now regarding who the best Quarterback is of all time, and it usually results in a Joe Montana versus Tom Brady debate.  I see a different problem that needs to be resolved.  Why were neither taken in the first round?  The NFL is a league where the play of an organization’s QB will affect coaches, management, and their families.

With record turnover with Head Coaches and General Managers, the common theme by the media is the inability to find a Quarterback.  From radio to ESPN talking heads, to a recent USA Today article, it is clear that a system that evaluates Quarterbacks well is of tremendous value.

Understanding Quarterbacks is not an easy task, but rather a complex problem.  It takes outside the box analytical thinking.  What if you could bring in not 1, not 2, but 3 Quarterbacks that if provided the opportunity would be successful?  The only way to do that is to understand what leads to success and then use it as a framework to determine the probability of success.  The Cowboys were ahead of their time when they formulated a draft pick chart and used arbitrage to amass talent that would bring multiple Super Bowl Championships.  They understood the value of an asset because they did the research and analysis to make it quantifiable.

The Green Bay Packers had a great stretch of years bringing in Quarterbacks that went on to have success with other organizations, and none of them required an early pick.  Among them were Matt Hasselbeck (6th), Mark Brunnell (5th), Kurt Warner (UDFA), and Aaron Brooks (4th).  None of them were starters sitting behind Favre who was acquired via trade for a 1st round pick.  The type of success by the Packers to evaluate the QB position is something a strong analyical system can replicate.  It proves that an organization can accumulate multiple Quarterbacks that have a high probability of success and are also undervalued in the market.  Using an approach that is measurable, it is very possible to cash in on the arbitrage that exists with Quarterback evaluation.  Obtaining QBs for far below the perceived market value would also help remove the monetary bias and allow a true competition for the job.  And a competition among a good group of Quarterbacks means success for the coaches, management, and their families.  It also means a very satisfied owner and fan base.

The Flying-20 On Trial: An Indicator Of Success For Wide Receivers?

At the MIT Sloan Sports Analytics Conference in 2012, an executive for the 49ers, Parag Marathe,  brought up a metric called the Flying-20.  This is the last 20 yards of a 40 yard dash.  He exclaimed that it is a metric that can be used to predict success, citing Jerry Rice as the example.  Whether Jerry Rice had a fantastic Flying-20 or not is irrelevant in this study.  What is on trial is the validity of the Flying-20 by looking at some of the best Flying-20 scores over the last few years.

 

Flying-20: 1.71

WR A.J. Love and WR Rondel Menendez

Undrafted out of South Florida, Love was waived twice by the Vikings this offseason and failed to catch a pass in preseason.

Menendez (Eastern Kentucky) had a leg up on Love in that he was drafted at #247 in the 1999 draft by the Atlanta Falcons.  Even so, Menendez never had a reception.

Flying-20: 1.72

Tyrone Calico and Eron Riley

Calico ran a tremendous 4.34 out of Middle Tennessee State and was drafted by the Titans in the 2nd round of the 2003 draft.  He played in 27 games, starting 8 and netting 42 catches for 501 yards and 4 TDs.  I would say that it was mighty fine production from a 2nd round pick with such a good Flying-20 score, but I don’t have a sarcasm font available to me.

Eron Riley was undrafted out of Duke and signed with the Ravens after the 2009 draft.  He never played a game for them, lasted 5 days with his next team the Panthers, spent a little time on the Broncos practice squad, and was released in December of 2011 by the Jets.  Just like the WRs with 1.71 Flying-20 scores, Riley does not have an NFL reception.

Flying-20: 1.73

Jeris McIntyre

McIntyre was selected in the 6th round in the 2004 draft by the Kansas City Chiefs after playing college ball at Auburn.  His Flying-20 score and SEC roots were not enough to net him any catches at the NFL level.

We have just looked at the five fastest Flying-20 scores in my database and among the 5 WRs, the average NFL stats are 8.4 receptions, 100.2 yards, and .8 TDs.  That is not a per game stat… that is a per career stat.

Flying-20: 1.74

Trindon Holliday, Ben Obamanu, and Isaiah Jackson

Another SEC player, Trindon Holliday was taken in the 6th round of the 2010 draft by the Houston Texans.  He has shown some dynamic return ability, but he has 6 fumbles to 2 receptions in his career.

Ben Obomanu was a 7th round pick in the 2006 draft by the Seahawks after playing his college ball at Auburn.  In five seasons, he has 87 career receptions for 1,209 yards and 7 TDs.

Isaiah Jackson was undrafted in 2012 out of Central Arkansas.  Although he did put up great workout numbers in his Pro Day, Jackson has not garnered much attention.

Flying-20: 1.75

Darrius Heyward Bey, Troy Williamson, and D’Andre Goodwin

Heyward-Bey was taken 7th overall in the 2009 draft by the Oakland Raiders after playing his college ball at Maryland.  Taken this high, and with one of the best Flying-20 scores, he has to be a shoe-in for success, right?  In 4 seasons, he has caught 140 passes for 2071 yards, and 11 TDs.  That turns out to be 2.5 catches and 37 yards per game.  I am starting to wonder if Marathe was just trying to bait teams into taking the high Flying-20 WRs if they didn’t do their homework.

Troy Williamson was also taken 7th overall in the 2005 draft by the Minnesota Vikings.  He lasted 3 seasons with the Vikings before being traded for a 6th round pick and played 10 games for the Jaguars, netting 8 receptions.  In all, Williamson had 87 catches for 1,131 yards and 4 TDs.

Goodwin went undrafted after the 2011 draft and has yet to catch a pass.  Do you think he is the one likely to break this trend?

In Conclusion:

Now that we have looked at the top 11 Flying-20 scores in recent years, and have very little to show for it, one must be highly skeptical that the Flying-20 is a legitimate metric to evaluate WRs.  In fact, you would have to go 13 deep before you found a WR that made a Pro Bowl roster.  That was Devin Hester, and he made it as a return man.  There is an answer on how to find quality WRs at a fraction of the cost, but it does not appear to be the Flying-20.

The Analytical Versus Emotional Approach

It never ceases to amaze me at how often individuals, businesses, and football organizations make decisions based on emotion and with no or limited insight.  A team tells itself, we must draft a Quarterback because we don’t have one, then selecting one by force that prevents the organization from making positive strides.  You will never get that pick back once it is made.  I am not going to mince words; emotional decisions are a feminine trait.  It is why estrogen is linked and tied to emotional swings.  It takes some fortitude to make smart decisions based on analysis and sound logic without worrying about what the fans think.  Scouts are guilty as well; there are some scouts would rather not make a call on a player out of fear for their job and would rather pass the buck to management. There are also some very intelligent scouts that have the ability to handle a structure that would give them leverage to do what they do best. Organizations can do things to empower their scouts and use their limited time resources more efficiently.

Whether you use a draft pick to take a QB should rely on logic, data, and risk analysis.   A more full approach would be to ask the right questions.  What is the likelihood success of Quarterback A?  If it is only about a 20% success rate, would I want to put my job on the line with those odds?  What if Quarterback B was 80%+ likely to be successful?  We do not have to go any further back than the 2012 draft to see teams making decisions based on an emotional approach and without proper risk analysis.  Maybe there aren’t any QBs that have a good probability of success in a particular draft… if you need a QB, are you still going to select one or are you going to use your draft picks to get the best overall return for your organization so that you can win over the long haul?  The QB decision should include a full analysis of all the available QB options; it should not neglect a QB that may be incorrectly evaluated using other approaches.  There are organizations that insist on being a drunk driver… oh, they may get home sometimes, but if they make a habit out of it, they are not going to get very far and may do a lot of damage along the way.

The key to the analytical approach is that it is quantifiable, measurable, and thus can be improved upon over the course of time.  Any other decision is a blind decision, increased risk for failure, not measurable, and thus not manageable.  It is not based on logic, but rather on emotion or “gut instinct”; a handful of practices, an experience with the player, an interview or two… in other words, a limited view of the overall scope.  Football is a great game, for it relies on teamwork and the objective couldn’t be any more black or white.  Did you win the last game of the season?  Are you measuring so that you can manage?  If that answer is no, then you are making a habit of getting drunk and trying to drive home.